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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. 
Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint 
path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account 
of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that 
intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the 
functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex 
joint actions.  
Keywords: joint attention, interaction, basic action, joint action, shared intention 
 
Joint actions are frequent in our everyday life. They range from a couple going out for a 
walk, to children playing tag, to more complex shared and cooperative activities 
sometimes involving a significant number of agents and complex institutional 
frameworks. Bratman (1992, p. 327) mentions the example of a symphony orchestra 
following its conductor. Keeping things simple, we consider in the present paper joint 
actions that involve pairs of participating agents. Specifically we discuss the role of 
intention and joint attention in joint actions. Although joint attention is often discussed in 
the joint action debate (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008; Sebanz et al 2006; Tomasello et al 
2005), a systematic account of the role of joint attention in joint actions and the 
conceptual relations between these concepts is still missing in the current literature. The 
present paper aims to provide the beginning of such an account. We propose an 
instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and 
argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action, which transitions from dyadic 
interaction to joint action. That joint attention is considered a basic joint action means 
that (1) it fulfills the minimal conditions to be a joint action, and (2) it is involved in 
many but not all complex joint actions. With reference to the agents’ shared intention we 
also distinguish between two different types of complex joint actions: joint path-goal 
actions and joint final-goal actions. 
The idea that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action (we argue) helps to clarify 
what can count as a joint action (i.e. how minimal one can go) and precisely when and 
how joint attention is part of more complex joint actions. Just as the discussion of 
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individual basic action in action theory attempts to say what kinds of things can count as 
actions, so in our analysis we attempt to say what kinds of things can count as joint 
actions. Furthermore, our account of joint action does not focus on the cognitive stance 
of a single individual (the kind of ‘methodological individualism’ that one finds in 
Searle, for example) but rather on what joint action implies about the interaction of two 
(or more) agents engaged in a joint action and involved in action coordination. To 
motivate this perspective we start with De Jaegher et al.’s (2010) notion of interaction.  
 
Interaction, shared intentions and joint action  
Following De Jaegher et al. (2010), we take interaction to be a mutually engaged co-
regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents where the co-regulation and 
the coupling mutually affect each other, and constitute a self-sustaining organization in 
the domain of relational dynamics. If the autonomy of one agent is dissolved, because 
one agent is the sole regulator of the coupling and the other is just co-present, this is no 
longer interaction in the strict sense. An agent’s relation with an object or tool is also not 
an interaction since here too there is no mutuality. As long as the conditions of this 
definition are fulfilled however, it can apply to cross-species interactions or even 
interactions with robots (that are autonomous in the sense intended). In the present paper 
we limit considerations to dyadic human-human interactions (‘social interactions’). In 
general, interactions include social interactions, and social interactions include joint 
actions.  
Joint action is a complex form of social interaction. There are different views in 
the current literature about exactly what constitutes joint action. Sebanz, Bekkering, and 
Knoblich (2006) define joint action as “any form of social interaction whereby two or 
more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in 
the environment” (p. 70).  They identify joint attention, action observation, task-sharing 
and action coordination as cognitive mechanisms through which a successful joint action 
can be achieved but do not suggest that shared intentions are involved in joint actions. 
On our view, in contrast, the coordinated behavior patterns are (more or less) specified 
depending on the shared intention the agents have. Joint actions always involve shared 
intentions (Carpenter 2009), and in part this is what distinguishes human group activities 
from those of other animals (Tomasello et al 2005).  
To clarify the notion of shared intention, consider first that common knowledge of 
aiming for the same goal is a crucial requirement for joint actions, as indicated by 
Sebanz et al (2006) and Tomasello et al (2005). Not only do we have the same goal, we 
are aware that we have the same goal, which makes it a common goal. But the fact that 
two individuals each have the personal intention to aim for a particular goal and the fact 
that they mutually know that they are both aiming for the same goal are not sufficient to 
capture the kind of intention involved in a joint action. Additionally, the personal 
intentions of the two agents need to involve a specific ‘we’-activity to make it a shared 
intention had by both agents. Searle’s (1990) concept of ‘we-intentions’ can help to 
specify the nature of shared intentions in joint actions. For Searle, joint action is 
collective intentional behavior involving we-intentions. Collective intentional behavior 
is not the same as the summation of individual intentional behaviors; thus, we-intentions 
cannot be analyzed into sets of I-intentions, even if these I-intentions are supplemented 
with beliefs about the intentions of others. If two (or more) agents aim for a common 
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goal in a way that their we-intentions are non-reducible to a set of I-intentions, we can 
say they have a ‘shared intention’.  
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places 
in a park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and 
run to a common, centrally located shelter. Each person has the 
intention expressed by the sentence ‘I am running to the shelter’. But 
for each person, we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely 
independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case there 
is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that 
happens to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a 
group of people in a park converge on a common point as a piece of 
collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an outdoor ballet 
where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge 
on a common point. We can imagine that the external bodily 
movements are indistinguishable in the two cases; the people running 
to the shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet 
dancers. Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but 
they are clearly internally different.”     
(Searle, 1990, pp. 402-403) 
In Searle’s first case, each person has the same goal (i.e. running under the shelter) but 
each one could express his or her intention to achieve that goal without reference to the 
others, even if each has common knowledge of the intentions of the other. They have a 
common goal, which is more than having the same goal since mutual knowledge of 
aiming for that goal is involved. In Searle’s second case, the dancers have what we call a 
‘shared intention’. On our view, having a shared intention implies not just having a 
common goal but also having a common goal that involves we-intentions (see table 1). 
The notion of we-intention implies the notion of cooperation and this involves 
interaction as defined above. Simply having mutual knowledge of having the same goal 
is not sufficient for a we-intention; it also requires cooperation among the agents or 
intention to cooperate among the agents.  
Crucially, however, for Searle, we-intentions are not shared intentions. He neither 
uses the term ‘shared intention’ nor makes use of the concept of we-intention to account 
for such a phenomenon. According to Searle, we-intentions are attitudes of single 
individuals. They are special intending attitudes of single individuals with a special 
mental content that involves a ‘we’-activity.  
In contrast, Bratman provides an account of shared intention in which he 
highlights the idea that a shared intention consists primarily of the interrelations of the 
agent’s attitudes. Following Bratman (1993), we take a shared intention “not as an 
attitude in any mind. It is not an attitude in the mind or minds of either or both 
participants. Rather, it is a state of affairs that consists primarily in attitudes (none of 
which are themselves the shared intention) of the participant and [intersubjective] 
interrelations between attitudes” (pp. 107/8). This approach needs to be distinguished 
from the atomism of Searle’s account of ‘collective intentions’, as well as from non-
individualistic accounts such as Roth’s (2004) account of shared agency and 
contralateral commitments, or Gilbert’s (2009) ‘plural subject account’ according to 
which agents form a joint commitment to act as a body as would a single individual. 
Bratman (2009) suggests that “a Searlean we-intention is, then, a candidate for the 
intentions of individual participants that together help constitute a shared intention, 
though Searle himself does not say how the we-intentions of different participants need 
to be inter-related for there to be a shared intention” (p.41). 
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In addition to having shared intentions, Bratman (1992) adds three other features 
to joint action. First, he suggests that mutual responsiveness to the intentions and actions 
of the other is necessary. This, however, is a feature of any kind of interaction and not 
specific to joint action. He also adds, second, commitment to the joint activity, and 
commitment to mutual support of the efforts of the other to play her role in the joint 
activity. Although we acknowledge a point made by Gilbert (2009), that personal 
readiness needs to be expressed by the agents for a joint commitment to the shared 
intention (e.g. by verbal or non-verbal gestures) in order to become common knowledge 
among the agents, we will argue that this does not necessarily involve reciprocal 
obligations of the agents to pursue the action or to act in a certain way. Finally, Bratman 
adds the idea that in joint action we need to mesh sub-goals.  
Even though we agree in large parts with Bratman, we put less weight on the 
need to mesh sub-goals. As we will argue below, the meshing of sub-goals may, but does 
not need to play a role in joint actions, and in some cases there are no sub-goals. 
Accordingly, we bracket this requirement in what we suggest are the conditions for joint 
action. All three of the following conditions are necessary, and together they are 
sufficient for joint action: 
1. having a shared intention (i.e. aiming for a common goal, involving we-
intentions). 
In general, having a common goal presupposes 
2. having common knowledge (shared awareness) of aiming for the same goal 
[and sometimes being obligated to pursue and support the intention].  
If agents have merely a common goal, they do not need to cooperate in order to achieve 
that goal (see above). However, having a shared intention means 
3. participating in cooperative behavior patterns (determined to varying degrees 
by rules or regularities) in order to achieve the goal [which may or may not 
include meshing sub-goals].2 
Whether and to what extent obligations are involved, and whether and to what 
extent meshing sub-goals is required, depend on the shared intention of the particular 
joint action. The shared intention involved in a joint action determines how agents need 
to coordinate their behavior in order to succeed in their cooperation. As we will show 
below, joint action is a complex form of social interaction in which agents do not just 
coordinate their behavior, but where coordinated behavior patterns are (more or less) 
specified in advance by rules and regularities dependent on the shared intention the 
agents have. ‘Cooperation’ involves coordinated behavior patterns, based upon those 
rules and regularities, to achieve a common goal.  
Joint actions can be joint final-goal actions, where agents coordinate their 
behavior in order to achieve an end-product or end-state, i.e. a final goal, which can be 
independent from the particular coordinated behavior pattern used to achieve that final 
goal. That is, the goal, e.g. robbing a bank, may be achievable in any number of ways.  
However, agents may also coordinate their behavior as an end in itself; call this a joint 
2 Crucially, to fulfill condition (3), the agents do not need to interact with each other cooperatively at the 
same place; as we will see below, a set of instructions by a coordinator may subserve the cooperation of 
agents at different places. 
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path-goal action.  In such cases, e.g. dancing together, the shared intention entails only 
the activity itself, and thus, the coordinated behavior patterns to achieve the common 
goal involving we-intentions are more (as in tango) or less (as in free-form disco 
dancing) specified in advance.  The distinction between joint final-goal and joint path-
goal actions should be viewed not as a strict difference in kind, but as two ends of a 
continuum since many actions share characteristics of both. As we’ll see, in this regard 
joint actions are sometimes ambiguous and can be described in complex ways.  
The more rule-governed the shared intention (i.e. the more the coordinated 
behavior patterns are specified in advance), the more specific are the commitments 
involved and the higher are the action expectations and obligations. It also seems right to 
suggest that less cognitive effort to mesh or monitor sub-goals would go into such rule-
governed contexts. The sub-goals are already pre-ordered by the rules or regularities. For 
example, if we decide to play chess together, we commit to observe the conventional 
rules entailed in chess and our action expectations in playing chess are based on these 
commitments; thus, you would protest if I used the rook like the queen. Also, once we 
accept all the rules entailed in chess, no sub-goals are left that might divert or stop our 
joint activity since our action opportunities within the game are prescribed in advance3. 
Additionally, we are not only obliged to observe the rules of chess when we decide to 
play chess together but we are also committed to finishing the play (though the 
commitment to finish the game is less formal than following the rules of the games). 
Thus, if your brother, who is an excellent chess player and with whom playing chess 
might be much more exciting for you than playing with me, arrives, I nonetheless expect 
you to finish the game with me.  
At least three kinds of constraints characterize the rules or regularities that 
determine the coordinated behavior patterns of two agents engaged in joint action in 
order to achieve a common goal involving we-intentions: (1) natural constraints (such as 
regularities that are biologically specified.  Imagine if we decide to go for a walk, the 
movements of the shared activity, walking, are determined by certain biological 
constraints); (2) rational constraints4 (i.e. aspects that are rationally specified such as 
mathematical rules that need to be observed in e.g. running an experiment), and (3) 
social/conventional constraints (i.e. aspects that are specified by conventions like the 
rules of chess but also social-cultural norms such as the agreed upon goal of finishing the 
game).   
In many joint path-goal actions cooperative behavior is highly specified in 
advance by rules and regularities.  Even in cases such as free-form disco dancing or 
improvisation, behavior is constrained by regularities and rules that define the action to 
be what it is, e.g., moving in relation to the music or following a general pattern within a 
specified realm of meaning. In contrast, many joint final-goal actions allow for different 
possibilities of coordination patterns useful for achieving the final-goal. Accordingly, in 
joint final-goal actions, more effort might be required to monitor and mesh sub-goals. 
3 There is no space left for sub-goals concerning the joint activity itself but there may be diverging sub-
goals concerning the situational features (location, date, etc.) in which the joint activity takes place. 
A regular application of logical/mathematical rules for the same purpose may become conventional by 
and by. 
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Imagine that we decide to cook together and that we take this to be a joint final-goal 
action where the final goal is to have dinner as the end product of our cooking; we enjoy 
eating but not cooking.  In this joint action there is still a lot of space left within this 
shared goal for diverging sub-goals; e.g., you might decide on a rare steak whereas I 
prefer a vegan dish. In other cases we might have different sub-goals that do not 
contradict each other, e.g., you might have the sub-goal to eat Spaghetti Bolognese with 
onions whereas I have the sub-goal that we eat at my home. In some cases, however, 
joint final-goal actions might also involve specifying in advance the coordinated 
behavior patterns to achieve the goal, which is the case if we decide to cook a specific 
recipe.   
The more rule-governed our joint action, the more are we obliged to follow these 
rules and the more are we in a position to demand from one another that we follow these 
rules. In general, joint actions involve the basic joint commitment to pursue the shared 
intention until it’s fulfilled. In joint final-goal action, fulfillment is achieved when we 
accomplish the final state or end-product for which we aimed. In joint path-goal actions, 
fulfillment is achieved simply by engaging in the joint action. In many joint path-goal 
actions fulfillment is not specified in terms of completing or bringing the action to a 
specific end. If so, no obligations to continue the joint action are involved in the shared 
intention. Imagine, e.g. we happen to meet each other in a discotheque. You pull me onto 
the dance floor and start to dance, and I respond to your dancing movements. Our joint 
intention is spontaneously formed in the action, and our commitment to the action is 
relatively weak. Either one of us can stop dancing to take a drink, or to start dancing 
with someone else whenever we want, and neither of us is in a position to expect or 
demand the other to continue dancing to the end of the song. 
 
Joint attention   
What, if any, role does joint attention play in joint actions? It is important to note that the 
terms ‘shared attention’ and ‘joint attention’ are defined in various ways in the current 
literature, and are sometimes used interchangeably (see Triesch et al 2006). Thus, we 
first need to clarify how we use these terms in dyadic and triadic interactions and joint 
actions.  
Simple and shared attention. From birth on, infants are attentive to external 
entities (call this ‘simple attention’) and are engaged in dyadic self-other interactions 
which involve dyadic attention where subjects are mutually attending to each other. 
Later, when the infant begins to follow the gaze of the other person, it may occasion a 
new form of attention (call this ‘shared attention’): the infant is aware of the adult being 
attentive towards the object and of herself being attentive towards the object. Baldwin 
(1995) equates joint attention with the simple result of gaze following: “the simultaneous 
engagement of two or more individuals in mental focus on one and the same external 
thing” (Baldwin 1995, p. 132). In contrast, we suggest that this co-orientation is not yet 
joint attention, and is only shared attention when one of the individuals is aware of 
himself and the other as being attentive towards the same external entity. Shared 
attention involves awareness, on the part of one subject, that both subjects are attending 
– I may knowingly attend to the same object as you attend to, but without you knowing 
it. However, shared attention, on this definition, is not yet a triadic form of interaction; it 
is rather a dual attending – a combination of simple attendings: a simple attending to an 
external entity, and a simple attending to the person being attentive towards the same 
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entity.  
Joint attention. Other theorists define joint attention by adding a further 
characteristic to shared attention, i.e., the mutual knowledge of both individuals as being 
attentive towards the same external entity, i.e. an object, other person, or event (e.g. 
Tomasello et al. 2005) accomplished via communicative cues (Carpenter and Liebal, in 
press). Call this ‘joint attention’ in a triadic self-other-entity interaction. From 9-10 
months onward, in the phenomenon of social referencing, for example, when infants 
start to refer to the other’s emotional expression to know whether to approach novel 
objects (Klinnert et. al. 1986, Moses et. al. 2001), the infant is engaged not just in shared 
attention but in joint attention, i.e., an interaction that includes the awareness that she 
and the other are both perceptually attentive towards the same external entity and that 
the other is aware of this shared attention as well.5  Striano and Rochat (2000) showed 
that whether 10-month olds (but not 7 month-olds) monitor and refer to others in 
ambiguous situations depends on the others’ attention towards them (i.e., the infants). 
That communicative cues in social learning situations involving joint attention evoke 
different learning effects than if those cues were absent is supported by empirical 
evidence from developmental psychology (Csibra 2010). 
Usually, joint attention means that individuals are visually mutually attentive 
towards an external entity. However, joint attention can also include other sensory 
modalities, e.g. our auditory modality when we enjoy listening to a concert together. 
Joint attention can be conducted in any perceptual modality, and in some cases is 
verified in communication (e.g., “Do you taste the sweetness of this wine?” – as we both 
taste the wine).   
 Intentional joint attention. In some of these examples, joint attention may 
involve a shared intention. If so, agents are not just mutually aware of being attentive 
towards the same entity. Rather, they also intend to be mutually attentive towards the 
same entity (where the shared intention may just be to maintain joint attention). On this 
definition, intentional joint attention (iJA) fulfills all three conditions of a joint action. In 
iJA, there is a shared intention (condition 1), which, at a minimum, may entail the 
immediate common goal (involving we-intentions) of maintaining joint attention (e.g., 
when we are both surprised by some object or event and desire to jointly remain 
attentive, perhaps for the sake of mutual enjoyment, or continuing our conversation). 
Even in the minimal case there is common knowledge (and likely desire) to maintain 
joint attention as the goal (condition 2), and to coordinate our behavior patterns to 
achieve this goal (condition 3). iJA may be involved in complex joint actions that take 
place in real interactive settings. Often, we need to aim for or maintain joint attention in 
order to cooperate. The coordinated behavior of our cooperation is defined by the shared 
intention we have (see previous section). Crucially, in joint actions we may require iJA 
either towards an external entity (e.g. if our shared intention involves lifting the box in 
front of us together) or to the event of our interaction itself (as in dancing the tango). 
5 Crucially, we use the term ‘joint attention’ to mean ‘joint attention in perception’. There might be 
another way to use the term to include ‘joint attention in imagination’ which goes beyond perception and 
involves the conceptual in the sense that two agents are jointly attentive towards a concept or an idea (our 
conversation about justice, for example, requires that we mutually attend to this concept and the 
conversation itself confirms that we do). But this is not the focus of the present paper.  
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Accordingly, joint actions may occur not only in triadic relations (agent-agent-object) 
but also in situations of dyadic interactions.  
 
Intentional joint attention as a basic joint action  
In joint attention each of the jointly attending perceivers is aware of herself and the other 
being attentive together towards an entity or event. When joint attention is involved, 
both agents typically interact in a triadic relation (agent-agent-object/event). Joint 
attention itself may (but does not necessarily) elicit a shared intention-in-action, perhaps 
because of the environmental circumstances or because of the intentional behavior of 
one of the agents. If it does, it becomes a joint action. In the minimal case, the shared 
intention to maintain joint attention is an end in itself, as in proto-declarative joint 
attention. As Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I) suggested, some actions are ends 
in themselves and are done for their own sake. Proto-declarative joint attention is often 
characterized precisely as something children engage in for its own sake (see Nichols, et 
al. 2005).  Engagement in joint attention as an end in itself, i.e. as a joint path-goal 
action, may be performed for the sake of mutual enjoyment. In our everyday life, 
however, we usually engage in iJA for reasons other than mere enjoyment. As we 
suggest below, iJA may fulfill the functional role of keeping our joint action on track 
and/or avoiding failure in regard to our shared intention.   
Given the definition of joint action outlined above, we argue that iJA is a basic 
joint action, on analogy with Chisholm’s (1969) instrumental definition of basic actions. 
First, we briefly review the literature on the concept of basic action, and then provide an 
instrumental account of basic joint action. 
According to Chisholm (1969), an action is basic when an agent performs it 
without performing it by performing some other action. In the case of a normal, 
complex, intentional action, if my intention is to get a drink, this is made up of more 
basic actions such as walking across the room, reaching and grasping the drink, etc. Not 
only are these basic actions intentional movements on my part, but also without these 
basic actions I would never be able to get my drink. Danto (1965), in contrast, appeals to 
the concept of causal relation to define the criterion of basicness. He emphasizes that 
“when M performs a basic action, he does nothing first that causes it to happen” (p. 142). 
Both of these views are controversial, as Hornsby (1980) makes clear. The first involves 
controversies about how to individuate actions (getting a drink may just be walking, 
reaching, and grasping such that these are not separate actions).  In regard to Danto’s 
definition, there is general consensus that a person’s doing one thing does not cause her 
doing another (Hornsby 1980, p. 67).  Moreover, various examples of basic actions 
provided by Danto and Chisholm suggest that simple (unmediated) bodily movements 
are paradigm cases of basic actions. However, this is not a consensus thesis in the 
literature and is denied by some theorists (e.g. Baier 1971; Hornsby 1980).  
Baier (1971, 168ff) further highlights that actions might be considered basic in 
various ways; (a) causally (as proposed by Danto), (b) instrumentally (as proposed by 
Chisholm), (c) conventionally -- “ ,”, 
(d) compositionally, (e) logically, (f) ontogenetically, (g) in regard to ease of 
performance or (h) ease of performance in isolation from the other actions. Such criteria, 
moreover, may be incompatible with each other; e.g. whereas an action may be basic in a 
genetic sense, it need not be the easiest to perform. 
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The value of the notion of a basic action for understanding more complex, non-
basic actions depends on the sense in which an action is considered as basic. For 
example, if we consider an action as basic in a compositional sense, a basic action 
constitutes (together with other basic actions) the component(s) of a complex joint 
action. To drive a nail into the wall, I need to hold the nail with one hand and to hammer 
on it using the other hand; ‘holding the nail’ and ‘hammering on it’ are both basic 
actions in a compositional sense that together constitute the complex action ‘driving a 
nail into the wall’. If we consider an action as basic in an instrumental sense, in contrast, 
the basic action provides (one of) the means to performing a complex action. To 
ventilate the room, for example, I need to open the window, which requires me to grasp 
the window catch and turn it around. I perform that rotating movement in an unmediated 
way without performing some other action; thus, it is a basic action in an instrumental 
sense.  
Relevant to the issue of individuating actions, one can ask whether basic actions 
(however defined) are really actions. Sneddon (2006) considers basic actions not to be 
real actions, but to be theoretical entities the existence of which requires demonstration 
(2006, p. 101). The usual strategy in regard to establishing the reality of basic actions is 
(1) to point to the phenomenology of action – i.e., that some bodily actions do seem to be 
unmediated and directly willed – or (2) to offer an argument involving avoidance of 
infinite regress – i.e., that not all actions can be mediated (see. e.g., Danto, 1979, p. 46). 
Sneddon, however, argues that basic actions are mere abstractions from normal complex 
actions instead of real actions themselves. On this view, the phenomenology, rather than 
supporting the existence of basic actions, only leads to reflective abstractions about 
action. Furthermore, the avoidance of infinite regress means, Sneddon suggests, that at 
bottom, instead of basic actions, we find processes that do not count as genuine actions; 
bodily movements should not be considered actions per se. Here one might accept that 
basic actions are only actions in a derivative sense since their intentional status, and 
important aspects of their motor control, derive from the complex intentional actions that 
they serve (see Baier’s example of tying shoelaces in order to make one’s hands move in 
the right way; also Ripley 1974).
Not all controversies about the concept of basic action, however, are relevant to 
the concept of a basic joint action.  For example, Sneddon’s suggestion that basic actions 
are not real does not apply to the concept of a basic joint action since there is no claim 
that we perform a basic joint action without performing some other real non-joint 
actions, and, unlike the concept of basic action, there is a clear motivational history that 
can be defined for a basic joint action such as intentional joint attention. Whereas 
debates about basic action may concern whether certain bodily events can be 
individuated as actions on their own, or not, and whether these events are necessary for 
and logically prior to more complex action, basic joint actions are joint actions as 
defined (above) by clear conditions involving (at least) two interacting agents and their 
shared intention. Indeed, one can analyze joint action into more subtle components of 
interaction (those that involve shared attention or the various bodily movements that 
constitute the required coordination). But, as we have shown, such components cannot 
be considered more basic joint actions, since they are not joint actions at all, even if they 
are interactional. What turns out to be more basic turns out not to be more basic joint 
actions, but non-joint actions (e.g., bodily movements of coordination) and interactions 
without shared intentions. Thus, we can offer an instrumental account of basic joint 
action:  
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A joint action is a basic joint action if two (or more) agents perform the joint 
action without performing it by performing some other joint action. 
 
Crucially, a basic joint action is prior to the distinction between joint path-goal actions 
and joint final-goal actions and can be a basic part of either kind.  
On this account, we argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action.  
Intentional joint attention is a real interactional process (not a theoretical entity or mere 
abstraction from some more complex action) in which we engage with others. Since iJA, 
insofar as it involves (1) a common goal involving we-intentions, (2) common 
knowledge of intending that goal, and (3) participation in cooperative behavior patterns 
in order to achieve this goal, is a joint action, and, on analysis, its components are not 
themselves other joint actions (but rather more subtle components of interaction – those 
that involve shared attention or the various individual actions that constitute the required 
coordination), then it is a basic joint action, and in many (and perhaps most) cases of 
more complex joint action, it operates as such.
The value of the notion of basic joint action in an instrumental sense for 
understanding a complex non-basic joint action is analogous to the value of the notion of 
a basic action in an instrumental sense for understanding a complex non-basic action 
(see above). A basic joint action such as iJA provides (one of) the means for performing 
a complex joint action. In the following section, we illustrate how iJA as a basic joint 
action provides a means to perform a complex joint action. In some cases, iJA is 
necessarily involved as a means to fulfill the shared intention of the complex joint action 
(e.g., if we intend to help each other lift a box onto a truck). In other cases, iJA may (but 
does not need to) be included in complex joint actions as a basic joint action (e.g., when 
we cook a recipe).  
Whereas joint attention may be involved in triadic interactions, intentional joint 
attention (i.e. joint attention for a mutually acknowledged purpose) is, as we will show, 
involved in many joint actions as a basic joint action in an instrumental sense. There are 
also cases of joint action, however, in which no joint attention is involved at all (see the 
example of terrorist action below). We have defended an instrumental and not a 
compositional account of basic joint action, and this is crucial, since iJA as a basic joint 
action may but does not need to be involved in complex joint actions such as, for 
example, playing chess (see below). Furthermore, iJA can stand on its own as something 
done for its own sake, as in proto-declarative joint attention.  Insofar as iJA does play a 
role in complex joint actions that take place in real interaction settings, iJA serves 
purposes other than itself, e.g., it may help to prevent failure of the larger action or to 
improve performance; accordingly, it derives its significance from the larger, more 
complex shared intentions and joint actions that it serves.   
 
Complicating the space of joint actions 
We made a distinction between (1) joint path-goal action, and (2) joint final-goal action. 
As we have seen above, this distinction relates to the question of whether the 
coordinated behavior patterns of the joint action in question need to be specified in 
advance. Furthermore, this distinction has motivational implications; whereas we are 
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motivated to perform joint final-goal actions because we aim to achieve a certain end-
product or end-state, we are motivated to perform a joint path-goal action as an end in 
itself, i.e. for the sake of mutual enjoyment.  
As we indicated above, the distinction between joint final-goal and joint path-
goal actions should be viewed not as a strict difference in kind, but as two ends of a 
continuum.  In this regard joint actions are sometimes ambiguous and can be described 
in complex ways.  At either end of the continuum we both may aim to perform a joint 
action (i) for its own sake, as a joint path-goal action (e.g., for the enjoyment of dancing) 
or (ii) in order to achieve a certain end-product or end-state, as a joint final-goal action 
(e.g., to win a dance contest). Furthermore, in joint final-goal actions, both of us may 
also enjoy the activity itself, in which case the joint final-goal action may involve sub-
path-goals. It is also possible that only one of us enjoys dancing for its own sake while 
the other is only in it for the win. Whether our sub-goals are in agreement or not, we may 
both agree on the final goal, in which case the joint action remains a joint final-goal 
action defined as such by the same end-state or end-product that both agents aim to 
achieve.  
Joint final-goal actions and joint path-goal actions are distinguishable according 
to such motivational aspects even as they may be indistinguishable to an external 
observer; our dancing the tango may look the same regardless whether we are dancing it 
for the sake of mutual enjoyment (as a joint path-goal action) or to improve our 
performances in order to win at the next dance contest (a joint final-goal action). In 
many cases, however, motivations may be mixed.  Along the continuum, various 
possible combinations test the limits of the concept of shared intention and the 
‘jointiness’ of the action. I may aim to dance the tango with you to win the contest, 
whereas you dance it only because you enjoy it (i.e., as a path-goal). Or winning the 
contest may be only your sub-goal, and your real intention is to impress the person you 
love, who is in the audience, whereas I don’t care if we win the contest as long as we 
prevent my arch enemy from winning. Many of the joint actions we perform in everyday 
life may be situated somewhere in the middle area of this continuum.   
In addition, iJA may or may not be involved in complex joint actions, whether 
joint path-goal actions or joint final-goal actions. A necessary condition for iJA being 
involved in a complex joint action is that the joint action in question takes place in a real 
interactive setting. As we will see, joint actions do not need to be performed in real 
interactive settings, and if so, it may be that no joint attention is involved at all. To 
determine whether iJA is involved or not in a particular joint action, further situational 
aspects need to be taken into account. We can begin by asking whether, in any particular 
circumstance, iJA could perform its main functional role6 in joint actions, i.e., to reduce 
the risk that the shared intention fails. As we have shown above, our cooperation in any 
joint action involves coordinated behavior patterns to achieve a shared goal – patterns 
which are based upon a set of natural, logical and/or conventional constraints of rules 
and regularities that are more or less specified in advance. In order to succeed in our 
cooperation, we aim to avoid the possibility that our shared intention will fail. Whether 
iJA is involved in a particular joint action or not in order to serve that functional role, 
depends upon the situational features in which the joint action takes place. Furthermore, 
6 We do not claim that this is the only functional role of iJA in joint actions. Another functional role of iJA 
in a particular joint action might be to improve our performance in a real interactive setting. In order to 
improve our performance in tango, e.g., we may need to be jointly attentive towards our actions.  
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these situational features might determine to what degree iJA will depend upon the rules 
and regularities of the joint action in question.  
Let’s start with an example of an action that involves a shared intention. On my 
way to the circus I happen to meet an acquaintance on the street. She is heading to the 
clown school and so is walking in the same direction. While she may or may not say “I’ll 
join you,” there is an implicit intention that we will walk together just in the fact that she 
does join me.  This sets up a joint action of walking together. We adjust our gait in order 
to stay together as we walk. However, we can adjust our gait without jointly attending to 
our walking. If an obstacle occurs on the road, in contrast, we may intentionally enter 
into joint attention in regard to this obstacle depending on whether in the given situation 
iJA is required to avoid the obstacle in a coordinated fashion. We cooperate and 
coordinate our behavior in a way that is determined by the natural aspects of our bodies 
and the environment, with or without iJA being required.  
In more complex forms of joint actions, stronger conventional commitments may 
be involved, e.g., in playing a conventional game like chess. However, our commitment 
to observe the rules of chess does not necessitate iJA. In playing chess, we may 
intentionally jointly attend to each move, and joint attention may be involved in almost 
the whole interaction. However, joint attention towards our moves is not required to 
fulfill our shared intention. We could play a game of chess without simultaneously being 
in the same room where the chessboard is located.  For example, at noon I make a move 
on the chessboard while you are away eating lunch. I then go to lunch and in my absence 
you return to the chess board, recognize my move, make your own, and then leave 
before I return, etc. etc. It would be difficult to claim that we engaged in joint attention at 
all, even though we could be said to be engaged in the joint action of playing chess. In 
this case, what keeps the game on track, and what mitigates the risk of failing to 
complete the action, are the established and agreed upon rules of chess playing.  
In other joint actions, successful cooperation cannot be achieved without joint 
attention. If so, iJA is necessary to fulfill the shared intention.  For example, if we intend 
to help each other lift a box onto a truck.  In other cases, a certain use of language may 
substitute for iJA. Imagine, for example, we set out to cook a certain dish together and 
follow a recipe.  Joint attention is required to keep cooperative behavior patterns on track 
to achieve the goal. We need to be jointly attentive towards those actions which 
determine the success or failure of our joint action, for example, adding ingredients to 
the pot. If you didn’t see me salt the soup, you would run risk of salting the soup a 
second time. In this example, a glance into the pot (in contrast to a glance at the 
chessboard) is not sufficient to determine the other’s action in order to coordinate our 
behavior. Hence, in following the recipe we intend to be jointly attentive towards our 
actions, and that, in part, determines the success or failure of our joint action. If our iJA 
is interrupted for some reason, we are committed to inform each other by verbal or 
nonverbal gestures about those actions we carry out that are essential for our joint action 
(which implies the commitment to pay attention to each other’s attention as well).  
As a substitute for iJA, however, we could employ a complete set of written 
instructions that specify who should salt the soup, and when, etc.  In that case, when I 
am attending to my task of salting the soup at noon, you may be reading your 
instructions about stirring the soup at 12:01, and we may proceed through the entire 
project without jointly attending to the other person’s actions.  As the following example 
makes clear, language may take over the functional role of intentional joint attention and 
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allow for successful cooperation in joint actions not just in real interactive settings but 
also in joint actions that do not involve any interaction among the agents at all.  
Imagine two terrorists having the shared intention of blowing up Big Ben, each 
one knowing that they share the same goal, and each one knowing that the goal will be 
reached only in cooperative actions. Neither terrorist, however, knows precisely what the 
other one will be doing. They wait at different places for instructions from their 
controller, and their behaviors are coordinated by his instructions. Here, no joint 
attention is involved; since one does not interact directly with the other and each is 
located in a different place, each is attentive only towards his own activity and no visual 
joint attention towards the other’s activity is possible. In this case, to carry out the joint 
action, a set of instructions from the controller is substituted for the iJA that in other 
cases (as in real interactive settings) might be required to succeed in achieving the 
common goal involving we-intentions. Nonetheless, the three defining conditions of 
joint action are fulfilled.  
In general, in joint actions there are matters of degree and a variety of 
ambiguities concerning the formation of shared intentions, the functional role of iJA, and 
the type of joint action involved. Joint actions can be planned in advance, and if so, they 
often involve certain spatiotemporal coordinates – when and where the action is to be 
performed. But joint actions can also emerge spontaneously, from a spontaneous joint 
attention due to the environmental circumstances of the social interaction or the 
intentional behavior of one of the agents.  
In some situations if formation of the shared intention and the common 
knowledge of having that intention are not prior to the activity itself, it would be 
paradoxical if the agents were able to cooperate, i.e. to coordinate their behavior to 
achieve their common goal together. We are not able, for example, to play Beethoven’s 
Ninth Symphony together in an orchestra without having the prior intention to do so (and 
the musical capabilities, of course). In other situations, however, prior shared intentions 
are not required. For example, if someone simply grabs another person and starts to 
dance, the shared intention – to dance – only emerges in the already ongoing action. The 
other person says (or thinks), after the fact, “Ok, let’s dance” Or “Hey, we’re dancing!” 
Only at that point does the shared intention emerge. Cooperative behavior patterns 
themselves however involve shared intentions-in-action. To carry out those shared 
intentions-in-action, joint attention may be required, or some set of instructions may 
substitute for it. Either by practice involving joint attention, or by following such 
instructions, joint actions may become habitual, or more formally established in or as 
institutions. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a concept of joint action according to which the nature of the 
shared intention involved determines how agents coordinate their behavior in order to 
succeed in their cooperation. In this regard, we distinguished between (i) joint path-goal 
actions, and (ii) joint final-goal actions, not as a difference in kind but as two ends of a 
continuum. We discussed different constraints involved in rules and regularities, which 
determine cooperative behavior patterns. Such rules and regularities lead to higher 
normative expectations but to a lower demand for meshing sub-goals. Furthermore, we 
proposed an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic 
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action, and argued that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action in an instrumental 
sense that may – but does not need to be – involved in complex joint actions. We 
discussed the functional role of intentional joint attention in joint actions, namely, to 
reduce the risk of the shared intention failing. Using a number of examples, we 
illustrated that the situation in which a particular joint action is performed needs to be 
taken into account in order to determine whether or not intentional joint attention is 
involved – or whether language, some set of instructions, or certain institutional 
arrangements can take over its functional role and substitute for intentional joint 
attention.  
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